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Important assessments of events and activities relating to military, terrorist and hybrid
adversaries, and the intentions of foreign governments, are made every day, usually involving
subjective or ‘estimative’ probabilities and an associated level of confidence. The way in
which these uncertainties are assessed and communicated can potentially have enormous
impact and consequences. Challenges are reinforced by increasingly complex intelligence
problems for which the contemporary analytic paradigm is not tailored to cope. It is
important to better understand how defence intelligence analysts and consumers handle
uncertainty in their assessment and decision support activities, and what challenges and
requirements they face in doing so. This is mainly achieved by the use of semi-structured
interviews with a sample of very senior consumers of military intelligence (mostly Flag
Officers of the Norwegian Armed Forces) and focus group interviews with groups of
Norwegian intelligence analysts. In general, respondents found it difficult or challenging to
conceptualize uncertainty analytically. This has implications for the communication of
uncertainty and its use in decision-making within the current framework. Secondly,
respondents were receptive to suggested potential improvements to the existing framework.
One such suggestion involved a differentiated framework, offering different levels of
uncertainty resolution in different situations, although none of the respondents had any
experience of such a framework for assessing or communicating uncertainty. We conclude
with some recommendations to improve the process of uncertainty and risk communication in
this important and consequential application area. Having particular implications for policy,
we recommend that analysts follow a differentiated approach in handling different situations
and problems comprising uncertainty, rather than pursuing a standard solution as is current
practice.
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Introduction
Different application domains have different approaches for conceptualizing and handling
uncertainty in support of decision-making. In this paper, we focus on how defence
intelligence analysts and consumers of intelligence (decision-makers) handle uncertainty in
their assessments and decision support activities, and discuss the nature of the different
challenges and requirements faced by them in doing so. Of particular interest is the degree to
which current analytic and tradecraft standards reflect a feasible and acceptable approach to
uncertainty handling in a complex operating environment, and how compatible these
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standards are with existing frameworks, from both analyst and consumer perspectives. This
is a sparsely populated topic in the intelligence literature.
There is an apparent inconsistency and conflation of terminology related to the term
“Estimative Intelligence” in academia as well as in extant doctrines and publications. One of
several pathologies within Estimative Intelligence is related to a missing consistent key
terminology underpinning existing frameworks for uncertainty and uncertainty handling.
Hence, the word “estimate” is often interchanged or conflated with other terminology with
different connotations (e.g. “predictions” and “forecasts”) signifying the nature of these kinds
of intelligence products which is mainly related to assessments of events and activities
relating to military, terrorist and hybrid adversaries, and the intentions of foreign
governments and other actors. The importance of having a consistent “tribal language” or
terminology underpinning this area of uncertainty handling is as important as in other
disciplines, e.g. medicine, political science, meteorology and geology. This is also advocated
by Lynham ( 2002) as being an essential element in theory building for applied disciplines.
Our objective in this study was to better understand how intelligence analysts and the
decision makers, or consumers of that intelligence, handle uncertainty within Estimative
Intelligence and what challenges they face in doing so. This was addressed primarily via a
series of semi-structured interviews. Expert interviews were conducted with Flag Officers of
the Norwegian Armed Forces to obtain the perspectives of intelligence consumers. Focus
group interviews with groups of Norwegian intelligence analysts were conducted to obtain
the perspectives of analysts.
Background
Current theory and practice
Sherman Kent’s renowned paper, “Words of Estimative Probability” (Kent 1964), set the
agenda for the next 50 years of discourse concerning how to address and handle uncertainty,
both analytically and as a means of communicating intelligence assessments to stakeholders
and decision-makers. Much of the discussion since then has been about how to establish and
communicate uncertainty, e.g. representing likelihood by using verbal descriptors alone or, to
reduce ambiguity, using subjective probabilities alone, or, as is currently the case, to use
verbal descriptors alongside a subjective probability scale where each descriptor is associated
with a range of probabilities (UK MOD 2011; NATO 2016). While these options relate to
likelihood information, there is also the need to represent the confidence associated with an
assessment. Currently, this is achieved with a verbal scale but in practice, there is some
confusion regarding the distinction between likelihood and confidence (Friedman &
Zeckhauser, 2014, 14).
Today, there is still no epistemologically justified theoretical foundation underpinning
analytical practices for uncertainty handling in Estimative Intelligence (Vrist Rønn and
Høffding 2013). Besides different understandings of the constructs and lack of
standardization, there is no framework related to elicitation of subjective probabilities,
aggregation of uncertainty including missing and ambiguous information, how to implement
likelihood (verbally/ numerically) consistently, or how to derive a consistent measure of
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confidence in assessments.
The current framework for Estimative Intelligence has remained to an extent unchanged
over the last four decades. It is mainly approached by a generic taxonomy of five distinct and
intertwined analytic paths in the processing of intelligence assessments.
These paths encompass “collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation”
(NATO 2016, 3-10; UK MOD 2011, 3-3), which in turn comprise aggregated uncertainty in
finished intelligence assessments.
The core of estimative intelligence involves subjective or ‘estimative’ probabilities, an
associated level of confidence and a source evaluation. The first of these three pillars
comprises a source evaluation by using an alphanumeric coding to assess the reliability of the
collection capabilities and information sources, and the credibility of the information and data
received from these sources (UK MOD 2011; NATO 2016). This form of source evaluation
encompasses a wide span of collection capabilities, ranging from human intelligence to
signals intelligence.
The second pillar involves the derivation of subjective or ‘estimative’ probabilities. This
is done judgementally and with no established methods or protocols for tailored elicitation of
probabilities. Representation of uncertainty in estimative narratives is normally done
numerically, or with a verbal description. Often, due to various preferences in terms of
preferring numerical versus verbal approaches to uncertainty, a so-called yardstick approach
is established. This yardstick uses a rank scale consisting of intervals of numerical
probabilities with corresponding words of estimative probabilities (NATO 2016; ODNI 2015;
Peterson 2008). The framework is not standardized, and there is a missing consistency in
terms of likelihood scales, the meaning of the various verbal probability expressions, and
how confidence is assessed and communicated (Jousselme 2016). However, there are several
good examples of empirical approaches intended to derive a consistent yardstick. A large
project conducted by Canadian Intelligence as well as years of work within climate research
clearly identify the challenges by utilizing such a method for communication of uncertainty
(Mandel, Barnes, and Richards 2014; Ho et al. 2015; Dhami 2017).
In order to support the measure of uncertainty established and communicated by a
subjective probability, it is normally mandatory to provide an associated level of confidence.
This is the third pillar. Besides taking account of the quality of underlying intelligence
sources, analytic confidence is also intended to account for the analytic methods used and
other relevant factors deemed necessary to support analytical reasoning (ODNI 2015;
Peterson 2008).
The only resembling facet to uncertainty and uncertainty handling which can be openly
accessed within academia, in professional doctrines/ publications and in intelligence
directives is the current Analytic Standards, issued by the U.S. Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI 2015). These standards and analytic ideals explicitly touch upon many
relevant aspects of uncertainty handling. This in turn may be viewed as a good basis,
preconditioned on making the standards concrete enough for a realistic applied context.
However, the extent to which these standards can be implemented and applied in practice is
still an ongoing discourse in academia (Marchio 2014; Gentry 2015).
4
Problems with current approach
Uncertainty handling in estimative intelligence has a number of characteristics, some of
which are shared with some other domains, and others which are more distinctive.
One characteristic shared with other domains such as medicine, climate change and disaster
risk management is the potential gravity of the consequences of having poor, missing,
inconsistent or ambiguous analytic premises as the basis for reasoning under uncertainty.
Another characteristic shared with emergency workers and some law enforcement
investigators is the way in which intelligence analysts often must work, in a pressurised,
time-constrained environment with insufficient time and resources to elicit and acquire a
desired level of knowledge and understanding to support decision-makers. Analysts often
must elicit, integrate and interpret incomplete and contradictory information, some of which,
in the cases of intelligence and law enforcement, may arise from an adversary’s use of
deception. These features of intelligence analysis impact the degree of objectivity in analytic
judgements, making them more susceptible to undesired cognitive biases (Goodwin and
Wright 2004; Heuer 1999; Tversky and Kahneman 1974).
An important dimension in this respect is the understanding, expectations and
requirements from intelligence consumers, which vary as a function of the level and type of
decision-maker. Hence, decision-makers who are military commanders in an operational
setting have different and possibly much more time-constrained intelligence requirements
than policy-makers in bureaucratic positions. However, in general, intelligence consumers
ought to have a good understanding of how uncertainty is handled and eventually
communicated when receiving estimative assessments based upon their own communicated
focused intelligence requirements. Otherwise they might assume that the intelligence they
have received warrants more, or perhaps less, credibility than is actually the case.
There is much agreement within academia and in military doctrine and publications
regarding the nature of security threats, driving forces and how the operating environment has
to be viewed and analysed differently relative to the Cold War paradigm of analysis. For
example, in NATO, UK and U.S. doctrines and publications, we find similar narratives in
terms of the operating environment and the importance of handling analytic uncertainty in
intelligence assessments and in operational planning (NATO 2010; SHAPE 2013; Ministry of
Defence UK 2014; US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2013). Moreover, the characteristics of problems
and challenges facing intelligence communities (ICs), military planners and decision-makers
are often reoccurring themes. These narratives agree that the character of conflict has
changed to a more complex operating environment with fuzzier operational boundaries,
increased uncertainty and non-linear effects. However, besides acknowledging the
importance of handling uncertainty consistently and analytically, the resolution is remarkably
low concerning how uncertainty is conceptualized in intelligence assessments and operational
planning. The latter includes operational assessments with inherent risk assessments.
Due to this perceived shift towards greater complexity in the operating environment, a
natural question is whether the current analytic framework for uncertainty handling is
sufficient and hence provides the necessary fidelity and analytic rigour to meet analytic
standards and decision-maker or intelligence consumers’ requirements for decision-making.
Many analytic problems facing intelligence communities today comprise what Conklin
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(2005, 5) and Moore (2011, 18) describe as “Wicked Problems”. These unbounded problems
are often characterized by non-linearity, adaptivity, social complexity, dynamic actors and
feedback mechanisms impacting how problems develop. Operational experience and lessons
identified from counterinsurgency settings often serve as a basis for describing such complex
operating environments (Connable 2012). For example, the effects of military strikes on
insurgency recruitment can vary widely in different situations.
These problems create significant analytical challenges in intelligence analysis, and the
current analytic paradigm, advocated by Lahneman (2010, 209) as “solving puzzles”, is often
criticised for not being able to cope with such problems (Connable 2012; Charters, Farson,
and Hastedt 2004).
There are few normative or prescriptive guidelines in terms of how to handle such
complex and unbounded problems when looking through an analytic lens. This is mainly due
to the generalization and hence low fidelity in extant doctrines and publications. The path of
least resistance in approaching analytic complexity with its inherent uncertainties is therefore
to embark on reductionism, which means a simplistic analytic approach to a complex
problem. However, this stands in contrast to the stated level of ambition encompassing a
“holistic” approach to analysis along the entire continuum of intelligence problems in order
to cover the inherent complexity comprising the operating environment (NATO/ ACT 2011;
SHAPE 2013). Despite the ambition, however, there is little concrete guidance as to how this
should be achieved.
Research objective and questions
With the current framework for uncertainty handling, and the dominant set of analytic
standards as a basis, the main research objective for this paper was to better understand how
intelligence analysts and the decision makers, or consumers of that intelligence, handle
uncertainty within Estimative Intelligence. A related objective was to gauge respondents’
attitudes to a tailored or differentiated uncertainty handling framework for defence
intelligence communities. Such an approach, which we are currently developing, would allow
different levels of uncertainty resolution to be pursued in different situations and for the
continuum of intelligence problems.
The research questions addressed are:
(1) What is the degree of consistency and analytical quality in the handling of
uncertainty within Estimative Intelligence?
(2) What are the main challenges, problems, and requirements related to uncertainty




Semi-structured interviews with intelligence consumers and focus-groups with intelligence
analysts were the chosen data collection methods. Besides the sparsity of literature on the
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research topic, another justification for using qualitative methods was to give respondents the
opportunity to provide answers within their own frame of reference, insight and
understanding (Aberbach and Rockman 2002, 674).
Interview protocols were constructed with an emphasis on eliciting a set of “attitudes,
values, beliefs” (Aberbach and Rockman 2002, 673) and approaches related to how
uncertainty in Estimative Intelligence is conceptualized, operationalized and coped with in
the context of analysis and decision-making in complex military operating environments. The
interview protocol further contained a set of probes and prompts to aid clarification, and to
help bridge the processes between transcription, coding and analysis. The interview questions
set forth in the interview protocols have a funnelling structure with themes in order to
increase the coherence of the responses. The questions encompassed current practices,
understanding, challenges and requirements related to uncertainty and uncertainty handling in
Estimative Intelligence in the context of complex problems.
Intelligence analysts, given the inherent characteristics of their tradecraft, are likely to
prefer to be selective in their answers. An open- ended approach to the elicitation process was
therefore judged to encourage their willingness to respond, and consequently to yield better
data. The data collection was tailored to capture the different perspectives between decision-
makers (intelligence consumers) and intelligence analysts, and to investigate the degree to
which there was agreement between them with respect to key issues. The interviews were
conducted in Norwegian, and further transcribed and translated into English prior to analysis,
integration and derivation of findings.
Sampling strategy
A purposive sampling method was chosen in order to address the research questions and to
exploit the researcher’s knowledge and ability to identify, and recruit specific expert and
analyst respondents. The main selection criteria entailed a judgmental assessment of relevant
background, operational experience, professional reliability and authority. Moreover, all
research participants have been carefully selected for their jobs (Tansey 2007, 770-771).
Consequently, a subjective and non-probabilistic sampling approach was taken. This
controlled selection process formed the basis for the selected sample of respondents with the
aim of establishing a focus on key issues within uncertainty handling in Estimative
Intelligence.
The main characteristics and size of the sample
Semi- structured, expert interviews were conducted with 10 intelligence consumers. The
majority of the respondents were flag- level (holding the rank or equivalent rank of a general
level officer in the army, i.e. brigadier and upwards) decision- makers/ intelligence
consumers. Each had extensive decision-making experience, and a comprehensive track
record from international service and operations within the framework of NATO or coalition
operations. All respondents were Norwegian officers. All participants were on active duty
except for two who had recently retired. Two focus groups (one with four and one with three
respondents) with active duty professional intelligence analysts were also conducted. A third
focus group interview was cancelled due to specific circumstances. However, the planned
focus group interview was replaced by an extensive semi-structured interview with a single
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analyst from the same intelligence community. Given the qualitative nature of this research,
we judged the sufficiency of the sample size in terms of achieving a satisfactory level of data
saturation, i.e. a point where no significantly new information was forthcoming. Furthermore,
there was a very limited pool of available analysts and, particularly, decision-makers to draw
from.
All of the interviews were tape-recorded in order to be able to focus on the interview, and
to ensure that the questions, probes and prompts in the interview protocols could be
addressed as deemed necessary. There were no significant issues related to the respondents
not being perceived as frank and willing to share their own experiences, beliefs and
requirements during the interviews. The interviews were conducted in a wide range of places,
ranging from their personal homes to business and official military establishments, all with an
atmosphere underpinning a good basis for interviews.
Ethical issues
There were no identified ethical issues related to the data collection processes, and these were
approved by the university ethics committee. All participants received an information
package in order to better comprehend the purpose, objectives and focus of the research
project. Written informed consent was obtained from all respondents. As an additional layer
of confidence building, a Certificate of Confidentiality was issued by the researcher.
Implementing an extra layer of confidence and trust was assessed to influence the degree to
which the respondents were willing to participate, and to be frank and willing to share the
desired information in such a context. The interview protocols without probes and prompts
were sent to the respondents beforehand for preparation purposes.
Analysis of qualitative data
There are few templated approaches for analyzing qualitative data, and various schools
advocate different approaches. Information elicited by conducting interviews has been used
to identify beliefs, values and new insights to contribute to the body of uncertainty handling
within intelligence. As opposed to a deductive approach, an inductive approach was chosen
in order to analyze information, extract key findings and to make inferences.
This approach was justified due to the lack of or missing “…predetermined theory, structure
or framework” (Burnard et al. 2008, 429) for uncertainty handling in Estimative Intelligence.
In turn the collected data was used to structure and conduct the analysis by using a thematic
content analysis. The analysis encompassed derivation of “…themes and categories that
emerge from the data” (Burnard et al. 2008, 430), which formed the basis for the coding
framework. Two coding frameworks, each with separate themes and a derived coding
hierarchy, were used for analysis, interpretation and derivation of key findings. The structure
and focused questions in each interview protocol simplified the data reduction and coding
processes. The analyst and consumer perspectives were each assigned one coding framework.
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Results and Discussion
To address the research questions, a set of key topics and themes related to uncertainty
handling in Estimative Intelligence was derived. There are three main themes which mirror
image the coding structure in the two different interview protocols:
• Theme 01: The nature of the modern operating environment
• Theme 02: Uncertainty handling in Estimative Intelligence- challenges and problems
with extant practices.
• Theme 03: Potential improvements to current practices in Estimative Intelligence.
Theme 1: The nature of the modern operating environment
There was a general acknowledgement and a common perception and understanding among
all the respondents in terms of how operations have changed since Cold War times. In this
context there was an explicit awareness of increased complexity and uncertainty being
inherent characteristics of contemporary and future crises and conflicts. There was little
deviation from the respondents’ answers in this regard compared to the mainstream academic
literature, and relevant extant military doctrines and publications, e.g. as described by
Odom (2008) and in NATO ( 2011). However, an interesting counterpoint was given by one of
the focus groups (FG 1) that situations are not necessarily more complex but the more
understanding we gain of a problem domain, the more uncertainty and complexity are
revealed.
Uncertainty as an analytic term and phenomenon encompasses multiple aspects and
approaches (Agusdinata 2008; Weiss 2007; Warren E. Walker, Lempert, and Kwakkel 2013).
Still, a paradox exists as key doctrines and publications encompassing intelligence and the
planning of operations emphasize the importance of treating multi-faceted problems
holistically and of handling analytical uncertainty in a rigorous and robust way. This is in
order to provide insight and understanding as a basis for producing estimative assessments
and for decision-making (SHAPE 2013; NATO 2016; NATO 2011; US Joint Chiefs of Staff
2013). However, within these domains uncertainty handling in complex problems is not
addressed with sufficient fidelity or with sufficient guidelines for practical application.
All of the respondents found that it was challenging to grasp the concept of uncertainty
due to its inherent character and perceived vagueness. When the respondents were asked
about their understanding of the nature of analytic uncertainty and the degree to which it was
operationalized, there were few clear answers, and the respondents acknowledged the
challenges of addressing and handling the topic in general. A typical quote from one of the
decision-makers (DM 3) was:
“…uncertainty is a vague term and concept. There is a clear requirement for a more systematic
approach to handle uncertainty”. [DM3]
Besides perceiving uncertainty as a vague construct which is difficult to conceptualize,
none of the respondents could refer to any concrete examples where analytic uncertainty had
been operationalized in terms of classifying uncertainties, weighing uncertainties or
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aggregating uncertainties in order to see their relative influence on the problem being
assessed. There was no notable difference in answers between the two groups of respondents,
making this a highly convergent finding. This is important for our current work which is
building towards the development of a more refined framework for uncertainty handling
within the intelligence domain.
A starting point in order to remedy the current status of uncertainty within the
intelligence domain could be to conduct systematic literature reviews addressing relevant
research and general literature “outside” the intelligence domain, and then do the same for
literature addressing uncertainty “inside” the intelligence literature. Good examples for such
an approach are reviews conducted for the discipline of Impact Assessment and a report
surveying research on the use of verbal uncertainty expressions (Druzdzel 1989; Leung et al.
2015). Also relevant is the work of Barnes (2015).
Further problems of a modern operating environment mentioned by both analysts and
decision-makers related to the extent of information which is now available, and the large
number of information channels beyond innate intelligence assets, create an information
overload. This phenomenon is discussed by Duvenage (2010).
Theme 2: Uncertainty handling in Estimative Intelligence- challenges and problems with
extant practices
The current framework for Estimative Intelligence, intertwined with standardized risk and
operational planning processes in NATO (and across member nations separately), has a low
fidelity in terms of applied and methodological guidance, except for considerable literature
on the general judgmental and cognitive aspects of decision-making under uncertainty.
Heuer’s (1999) book, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, brings forward synthesized
research from cognitive psychology on issues related to thinking, judgment and cognitive
biases in particular. These aspects in studies of surprise attack and intelligence failures have
had a sedimented place in academia and military doctrines/ publications and, as a result, been
a dominant belief within the intelligence literature for the last two decades.
However, as Marrin (2004) already commented some years ago, this area of research has to
an extent “…been mined for insight” (661).
As a result of focusing on these aspects of thinking and decision- making within the
intelligence related literature, the findings from research within psychology became a
dominant factor in developing analytical techniques which were intended to be tailored to
intelligence analysis (Mandel 2009; National Research Council 2010). This heritage is still
strong today and, as a result, the intelligence discipline suffers from a poor theoretical and
epistemological justification upon which to evaluate and develop approaches to analytic
uncertainty, particularly for complex problems or scenarios.
The respondents were asked about key issues related to extant practices in Estimative
Intelligence. The majority of the decision-makers interviewed preferred to receive likelihood
information in verbal terms. However, the extent to which they related those to the associated
numerical scale was not made clear. There was also a common view from them that the
communication of analytic confidence lacked transparency. This is perhaps not surprising
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since it is a function of several elements, including source characteristics, assumptions made
and analytic methods employed. One decision-maker noted:
“…the main impression [is]that there is a lack of a disciplined approach to derivation and
communication of analytic confidence in assessments”. [DM 1]
However, as a partial explanation, the first focus group of analysts noted that:
“[There is an]important balance in terms of how much uncertainty is required and relevant to
communicate to a consumer. What a consumer requires in terms of details and information about
processes, methods and analytical inference underpinning estimates do vary”. [FG1]
It is important to emphasize, however, that the majority of the respondents were clear on
some mitigation strategies or quality assurance mechanism to handle uncertainty in both
analysis and decision-making. This was mainly related to critical thinking, discussions with
and among peers and analysts, and if time permitted, to gain insight into the analytical
foundation underpinning estimative assessments. Techniques such as formal peer review
processes, devils advocacy, and red-teaming (US Government 2009; Heuer 2005) all serve
more or less the same intention and there is plentiful literature related to these. That intention
is to minimize biases, to consider alternative explanations and alternatives, and to avoid
logical flaws and analytical pitfalls. While these all have a bearing on analytic uncertainty,
their relationship to it is often not made explicit.
An interesting point raised by several decision-makers was the impression that analysts
had a tendency to present too much intelligence in the form of facts and sometimes appeared
reluctant to make probabilistic predictions. One decision-maker highlighted the importance of
“daring to be explicit about uncertainties”. While there may be behavioural reasons for this,
another explanation could be related to today’s proliferation of multiple information
channels, mentioned earlier. Analysts may simply feel obliged to communicate much of this
factual information in case it proves relevant, or for fear of otherwise being considered
uninformed. One decision-maker noted:
“…in complex problems, [there is] a presence of hesitancy to handle uncertainty and to predict versus
traditional emphasis on facts/ what is known. Hence, [there is] a general hesitancy to enter the “room
of uncertainty“in estimative assessment”. [DM 3]
Theme 3: Potential improvements to current practices in Estimative Intelligence
A set of questions was posed to the respondent groups to assess the potential for some
suggested improvements in order to enhance the existing framework for Estimate
Intelligence.
It is current practice in military operational planning processes to derive and evaluate a
plan based on considering at least two possible courses of action of an adversary: the most
likely and the most dangerous course of action (SHAPE 2013; US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2009).
An estimative assessment is fused into this planning process, which also has a deliverable in
terms of presenting a limited number of courses of action, seen through the prism of an
opposing actor or belligerent (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2009). Risk management and thus
uncertainty handling is also an inherent part of these processes in terms of evaluating the
criterion of acceptability related to the dimensions of risk-to-force and risk-to-mission
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(NATO 2018; SHAPE 2013). In the context of risk management, estimative assessments are
applied in order to consider the likelihood of events occurring and unfolding.
This is an example of how complex problems are subject to uncertainty handling by
using a reductionist approach. A complicated or complex problem is reduced to something
that can be handled analytically given the specific constraints of time, insight/ understanding
and resources. Current methodology is based on extracting a small number of possibilities
from an infinite space of possibilities, and then focusing on refining these alternatives until a
decision is made. While Lahneman (2010) describes the current analytic paradigm as not
having developed along with the changing operating environment for several decades,
Connable (2012, 1) reinforces this critique by suggesting a failure of intelligence
communities to assess complex operating environments. This inflexible and simplistic
approach to complex problems in particular is criticised by several authors.
If time and resources allowed, most decision-makers had a general preference for being
presented with multiple alternatives/ scenarios, each with a measure of likelihood and
associated analytic confidence attached. This was to be able to make their own judgements
given the relevant factors and assessments being presented. One decision-maker said:
“…if time and resources permit, there is a moral obligation by a commander in operations to consider
multiple explanations/ possibilities in order to make good judgments. Being only presented with a most
likely and most dangerous course of action as an analytical “gold nugget” is often not sufficient in an
operational planning phase”. [DM 9]
It was emphasised by several decision-makers that this preference was dependent on the time
available and also on the degree of risk present. One decision-maker noted:
“In high risk decisions, [there is] a higher demand for insight and understanding”. [DM 4]
A related issue concerns the derivation, handling and purpose of analytic confidence in
estimative assessments. All respondents agreed on the importance of knowing whether or not
further collection and analysis would yield any difference in terms of reducing analytic
uncertainty to the point where a different decision might be taken. Thus, the respondents
clearly required an assessment from analysts if any additional resources spent were likely to
only yield a marginal difference to the level of uncertainty. This is paramount to know in
decision-making processes in order to avoid missing time-limited opportunities, and in the
allocation of scarce resources to maximize effects. The focus group respondents (analysts)
clearly agreed with the decision-makers in terms of the importance of this issue. This aspect
relates to decision sensitivity, and is also addressed by Friedman and Zeckhauser (2014) who
suggest using analytic confidence as a way of expressing “…the value of additional
information” (89).
Decision sensitivity also directly relates to the risk management framework in terms of
allocation of scarce resources to try and mitigate risk that is not mitigatable. It was mentioned
that trying to reduce uncertainty or mitigate risk may in certain cases result in a reactive
posture, which in turn may influence the required operational freedom. DM 5 notes:
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“…if there is too much focus on risk, trying to mitigate all derived risks, we can end up with a
scattering of focus and resources which in turn can be counterproductive in terms of achieving desired
effects in an operational context”. [DM 5]
Decision sensitivity could also be linked to a more user-driven approach to uncertainty
handling (Gabbert et al. 2010). This may imply that decision-makers explicitly communicate
their requirements to intelligence analysts in terms of their need for uncertainty information.
Another relevant link to extant research concerns how decision-makers form coping
strategies as a function of being presented with uncertainty in assessments (Lipshitz and
Strauss 1997). This could provide a useful basis for further investigation.
We were interested in gauging the participants’ views regarding a more differentiated
approach to uncertainty handling. The majority of the respondents from both interview
groups had not been exposed to or used any differentiated framework for uncertainty
handling in which analytical requirements and consumer requirements/ expectations had been
operationalized as a function of, for example, the problem complexity and scenario specific
operational constraints. It was noted by DM2 that:
“Such a framework must be flexible in terms of operational constraints, type of problem, types of
intelligence and types of consumers”. [DM 2]
Given the characteristics of the existing framework for uncertainty handling, these findings
provide support for the potential usefulness and relevance of developing a tailored framework
for uncertainty handling in Estimative Intelligence. Nonetheless, some of the respondents
among the analysts were clearly sceptical to embark on another layer of time-consuming
analytical processes. Furthermore, some were concerned that this might somehow impact
negatively on the analysts themselves:
“…by introducing new methods/ tools, the analytic organization may end up in relying too much on the
methods/ tools and as a consequence lower the requirements to analysts handling the tools”. [FG 1]
In fact, any such change would almost certainly increase requirements for analyst capability.
However, their answers also indicated a positive attitude and willingness to consider such a
framework from the majority of the analyst respondents.
Several of the decision-makers had a general preference for being presented with
simplistic models and graphical representations. However, there were no examples provided
of any particular graphical representations of uncertainty. Only one decision-maker explicitly
called for the use of more sophisticated models by analysts:
“Harder methods or models may be important for intelligence communities to use in order to better
embrace the dynamic, uncertain and complex operating environment”. [DM 3]
This, together with the general preference for verbal representation of uncertainty by most of
the decision-makers, suggests that careful thought will be required concerning how the
outputs from any differentiated approach are communicated. Looking and learning from other
disciplines should be an important part of any such framework development. Some
frameworks assessed to be relevant can be found in model-based decision-support (Walker et
al. 2003), the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) guidance on uncertainty (Benford et
al. 2018) and within the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in context of
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IPCC guidance notes (Mastrandrea et al. 2010).
Even though an improved uncertainty framework may help to provide better insight and
understanding of analytic uncertainty, and consequently an enhanced foundation for decision-
making, it is also important to decide whether or not this is a tool for analysts alone, or if the
framework ought to have a combined intention, taking into consideration requirements set
forth by a variety of intelligence consumers requiring estimative assessments with different
levels of fidelity, and serving various purposes.
Conclusions, Policy Implications and Recommendations
The current framework for uncertainty handling in Estimative Intelligence has remained more
or less unchanged over the last five decades. Moreover, the framework is simplistically
constructed, and not theoretically justified to enable the applied dimension of the tradecraft to
evolve naturally as a result of joint efforts between academics and practitioners.
There is considerable revitalized research available and ongoing academic discussion
devoted to, for example, whether to use words, numerical probabilities or both to assess and
communicate subjective likelihood assessments, and how to best approach the notion of
confidence in such assessments. Given the increased requirements for quality, expectations
from consumers and the extent to which the analytical standards for uncertainty handling are
realistic and can be complied with, relatively little research has been devoted to uncertainty
handling from the perspectives of decision-makers and analysts explicitly. Notable
exceptions, concerning the communication of uncertainty in particular, are provided by
Dhami (2017), Ho et al. (2015) and Mandel and Barnes (2014).
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this study which drew information from
serving intelligence analysts and senior military decision-makers with extensive operational
experience.
1. Among intelligence analysts and consumers, there is a general acknowledgement and an
understanding of how operations have changed in contemporary scenarios and, consequently,
an awareness of increased levels of complexity and uncertainty related to Estimative
Intelligence. The proliferation of information channels outwith a force’s own intelligence
function can create additional problems.
2. There is a general challenge for both intelligence analysts and consumers in
conceptualizing uncertainty due to its inherent character and perceived vagueness. The lack
of transparency related to the meaning, derivation and communication of analytic confidence
was a particular concern for decision-makers.
3. Several decision-makers felt that analysts had a tendency to provide a great deal of factual
information but were less comfortable in providing predictions. This may be partly due to the
proliferation of information mentioned above.
4. There was agreement among analysts and decision-makers that it would be useful to know
more about the likely change in uncertainty which further intelligence gathering might bring
and any subsequent effect on decision-making.
5. From decision-makers there was support for the provision of multiple assessments rather
than just two assessments, based on the most likely and most dangerous actions of an
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adversary. However, they were also clear that this should only be when time permits. This in
itself is evidence of support for a differentiated approach.
6. There was little experience of a differentiated approach to uncertainty handling among
either analysts or decision-makers. There was interest shown, however, and an understanding
of why this might be useful. Some analysts were concerned about the possible impact of such
an approach on them.
Policy implications of our findings
Based upon the findings from the study, together with a comprehensive literature review of
uncertainty handling in Estimative Intelligence, the main implications for practice are related
to further requirements for the conceptualization and operationalization of uncertainty. These
are needed in order to meet changing requirements for analytic uncertainty handling,
increased expectations for quality in evidence-based decision-making, and an
acknowledgement of the complexity typical of contemporary intelligence problems.
They are particularly needed to meet consumer requirements for transparency and
understanding of the underpinning uncertainties around estimative assessments. Moreover,
better analytic traceability provides a better basis for conducting and communicating analysis
and assessments in a collaborative environment, across intelligence communities and other
cooperative entities. The rather fixed nature of the extant framework inhibits flexibility and
transparency.
In order to overcome these limitations, we believe that a more systematic and
differentiated approach to uncertainty handling in the intelligence domain is required. With
such an approach, different levels of uncertainty resolution (e.g. regarding the type and
location of the uncertainty) could be communicated depending on scenario characteristics and
operational constraints, such as available time.
Recommendations
Further research is needed to improve the level of transparency in the communication of
uncertainty between analysts and consumers and to provide clearer guidance on how current
analytic standards can be operationalized in practice.
It is also recommended to seek good practice from other domains and disciplines with a
view to developing a differentiated uncertainty handling framework which is suitable for
defence intelligence communities. Such a tailored framework for uncertainty handling should
be viewed as a complement to and evolution of the current framework for Estimative
Intelligence, and should take account of the continuum of intelligence problems, domain
specific operational constraints and decision-maker requirements.
The current framework used by the IPCC is one good example of a relevant framework
to consider (Budescu et al. 2014; Mastrandrea et al. 2010). In addition, conceptual
frameworks and models for handling of uncertainty in model-based decision-support
(Walker et al. 2003; NATO RTO 2012), and in food safety (Benford et al. 2018; Lofstedt,
McLoughlin, and Osman 2017), both comprise a good and relevant basis for framework
development of uncertainty handling in Estimative Intelligence. To incorporate how
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Estimative Intelligence is intertwined with operational planning and risk management, it is
also recommended to evaluate how Walker, Haasnoot, and Kwakkel (2013) advocate
approaches related to Adaptive Policy Making (APM) and Robust Decision Making (RDM).
We have already started work on developing such a new framework, and will report on its
development in due course.
Besides increasing awareness and transparency in analytical processes, such a framework
is also expected to provide a better basis upon which to evaluate and empirically test the large
number of Structured Analytical Techniques (SAT) developed for the intelligence domain,
with an emphasis on how they handle uncertainty in the context of complex problems.
Limitations of the study
The inherent nature of qualitative research is in general subject to criticism. As Anderson
(2010) emphasizes, rigor is “…difficult to maintain, assess and demonstrate” (2). Two
apparent limitations of the study are related to the characteristics of the selected sample and
the sample size. A consequence of purposive sampling is susceptibility to selection bias,
which in turn can influence the degree of “robust findings and generalizations” (Tansey 2007,
768). However, in this case our samples come from small, relatively homogeneous groups,
within which the members have received similar training in the intelligence domain. In
addition, many of them will have similar levels and types of operational experience. Perhaps
partly because of this, it was noticeable that there was considerable agreement in their
responses. This suggests that larger samples are unnecessary as long as the aim is not to
generalize to a wider population, such as all NATO officers or all decision-makers (including
civilians) receiving this kind of intelligence. Even then, given common operating procedures
for handling intelligence within NATO, any differences would most likely be caused by
national or cultural differences.
Complementing the sample type by conducting expert interviews with senior civilian
policy-makers and intelligence consumers (e.g. politicians) could yield additional insight and
new perspectives but access to this group would be more difficult. Lastly, besides enhancing
analytical rigour by, for example, a triangulation approach, there are always limitations of
time, resources and availability of respondents which in turn constrain all research projects.
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